Philosophical Studies

, Volume 163, Issue 2, pp 403–427

Coming true: a note on truth and actuality


DOI: 10.1007/s11098-011-9822-2

Cite this article as:
Dietz, R. & Murzi, J. Philos Stud (2013) 163: 403. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9822-2


John MacFarlane has recently presented a novel argument in support of truth-relativism. According to this, contextualists fail to accommodate retrospective reassessments of propositional contents, when it comes to languages which are rich enough to express actuality. The aim of this note is twofold. First, it is to argue that the argument can be effectively rejected, since it rests on an inadequate conception of actuality. Second, it is to offer a more plausible account of actuality in branching time, along the line of David Lewis (Noûs 4:175–88, 1970; Postscripts to ‘Anselm and actuality’, Philosophical papers I, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983).


Truth-relativismContextualismActualityFuture contingents

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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of TokyoTokyoJapan
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of KentCanterburyUK
  3. 3.Munich Center for Mathematical PhilosophyLudwig-Maximilians UniversitätMunichGermany