Expressivism and plural truth
- Michael P. Lynch
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Contemporary expressivists typically deny that all true judgments must represent reality. Many instead adopt truth minimalism, according to which there is no substantive property of judgments in virtue of which they are true. In this article, I suggest that expressivists would be better suited to adopt truth pluralism, or the view that there is more than one substantive property of judgments in virtue of which judgments are true. My point is not that an expressivism that takes this form is true, but that it more readily accommodates the motivations that typically lead expressivists to their view in the first place.
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- Expressivism and plural truth
Volume 163, Issue 2 , pp 385-401
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Frege–Geach problem
- Michael P. Lynch (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Philosophy Department, University of Connecticut, U-2054, Storrs, CT, 06269, USA