Philosophical Studies

, Volume 163, Issue 2, pp 385–401

Expressivism and plural truth

Authors

    • Philosophy DepartmentUniversity of Connecticut, U-2054
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-011-9821-3

Cite this article as:
Lynch, M.P. Philos Stud (2013) 163: 385. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9821-3

Abstract

Contemporary expressivists typically deny that all true judgments must represent reality. Many instead adopt truth minimalism, according to which there is no substantive property of judgments in virtue of which they are true. In this article, I suggest that expressivists would be better suited to adopt truth pluralism, or the view that there is more than one substantive property of judgments in virtue of which judgments are true. My point is not that an expressivism that takes this form is true, but that it more readily accommodates the motivations that typically lead expressivists to their view in the first place.

Keywords

ExpressivismTruthPluralismMinimalismMeta-ethicsFrege–Geach problem

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011