Hmm… Hill on the paradox of pain
- Alex Byrne
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Bodily sensations, for instance pains, are often thought to pose insuperable difficulties for representational theories of consciousness. Chris Hill is never one to dodge a problem, and chapter 6 of his splendid and instructive Consciousness is devoted to outlining a perceptual/representational theory of pain, in the tradition of Armstrong and Pitcher.
Perceptual theories of pain are not the same as representational theories of pain. According to a perceptual theory of pain, when one has a pain in one’s toe (for example), one perceives some sort of disturbance in one’s toe. (At least in a typical case: the perceptual theorist will want to allow for illusions and hallucinations of such disturbances).
A perceptual theorist might even hold that the experience of pain is never veridical (as some hold that experiences of color are never veridical). This “eliminativist” variant of the perceptual theory will be ignored here.Pain perception is interoception—perception specialized
- Armstrong, D. M. (1968). A materialist theory of the mind. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Aydede, M. (2009). Is feeling pain the perception of something? Journal of Philosophy, 106, 531–567.
- Ganson, T., & Ganson, D. (2010). Everyday thinking about bodily sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 88, 523–534. CrossRef
- Hill, C. (2005). Ow! The paradox of pain. In M. Aydede (Ed.), Pain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Hill, C. (2009). Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hmm… Hill on the paradox of pain
Volume 161, Issue 3 , pp 489-496
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- Springer Netherlands
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- Alex Byrne (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT, 32-d808, Cambridge, MA, 02139-4307, USA