Surveys, intuitions, knowledge attributions
- Patrick Rysiew
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Keith DeRose has not been shy about placing a lot of weight on certain intuitions in arguing for epistemic contextualism (EC). Most notably, he advertises the apparent (intuitive) truth of certain surface-incompatible claims involving ‘knows’ As opposed to claims about knowledge, or who knows what: epistemic contextualism (EC) is a semantic thesis about the truth conditional contents of the propositions expressed by certain sentences—viz., that they are ‘context’-dependent and—variable: in itself, EC is silent about knowledge. For discussion of this and other points, arguments and issues surrounding EC, see Rysiew 2007a. The contextualist argument based on such pairs of cases ultimately rests on the key premisses that the positive attribution of knowledge[
As opposed to claims about knowledge, or who knows what: epistemic contextualism (EC) is a semantic thesis about the truth conditional contents of the propositions expressed by certain sentences—viz., that they are ‘context’-dependent and—variable: in itself, EC is silent about knowledge. For discussion of this and other points, arguments and issues surrounding EC, see Rysiew 2007a.as a central part of “[his] main positive argument for contextualism” (2009, 69). His well-known Bank Case, or pair of Cases, gets introduced on p. 1 of his recent book, The Case for Contextualism. There, he writes:
The contextualist argument based on such pairs of cases ultimately rests on the key premisses that the positive attribution of knowledge[
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- Surveys, intuitions, knowledge attributions
Volume 156, Issue 1 , pp 111-120
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- Patrick Rysiew (1)
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- 1. University of Victoria, Victoria, BC, Canada