, Volume 156, Issue 1, pp 111-120
Date: 08 Sep 2011

Surveys, intuitions, knowledge attributions

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Keith DeRose has not been shy about placing a lot of weight on certain intuitions in arguing for epistemic contextualism (EC). Most notably, he advertises the apparent (intuitive) truth of certain surface-incompatible claims involving ‘knows’

As opposed to claims about knowledge, or who knows what: epistemic contextualism (EC) is a semantic thesis about the truth conditional contents of the propositions expressed by certain sentences—viz., that they are ‘context’-dependent and—variable: in itself, EC is silent about knowledge. For discussion of this and other points, arguments and issues surrounding EC, see Rysiew 2007a.

as a central part of “[his] main positive argument for contextualism” (2009, 69). His well-known Bank Case, or pair of Cases, gets introduced on p. 1 of his recent book, The Case for Contextualism. There, he writes:

The contextualist argument based on such pairs of cases ultimately rests on the key premisses that the positive attribution of knowledge[