Philosophical Studies

, Volume 163, Issue 1, pp 151–170

On behalf of the consequence argument: time, modality, and the nature of free action


DOI: 10.1007/s11098-011-9791-5

Cite this article as:
Finch, A. Philos Stud (2013) 163: 151. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9791-5


The consequence argument for the incompatibility of free action and determinism has long been under attack, but two important objections have only recently emerged: Warfield’s modal fallacy objection and Campbell’s no past objection. In this paper, I explain the significance of these objections and defend the consequence argument against them. First, I present a novel formulation of the argument that withstands their force. Next, I argue for the one controversial claim on which this formulation relies: the trans-temporality thesis. This thesis implies that an agent acts freely only if there is one time at which she is able to perform an action and a distinct time at which she actually performs it. I then point out that determinism, too, is a thesis about trans-temporal relations. I conclude that it is precisely because my formulation of the consequence argument emphasizes trans-temporality that it prevails against the modal fallacy and no past objections.


Free willFree actionConsequence argumentIncompatibilismNo past objectionAccidental possibility

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyNorthern Illinois UniversityDekalbUSA