On behalf of the consequence argument: time, modality, and the nature of free action
- Alicia Finch
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The consequence argument for the incompatibility of free action and determinism has long been under attack, but two important objections have only recently emerged: Warfield’s modal fallacy objection and Campbell’s no past objection. In this paper, I explain the significance of these objections and defend the consequence argument against them. First, I present a novel formulation of the argument that withstands their force. Next, I argue for the one controversial claim on which this formulation relies: the trans-temporality thesis. This thesis implies that an agent acts freely only if there is one time at which she is able to perform an action and a distinct time at which she actually performs it. I then point out that determinism, too, is a thesis about trans-temporal relations. I conclude that it is precisely because my formulation of the consequence argument emphasizes trans-temporality that it prevails against the modal fallacy and no past objections.
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- On behalf of the consequence argument: time, modality, and the nature of free action
Volume 163, Issue 1 , pp 151-170
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
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- Free will
- Free action
- Consequence argument
- No past objection
- Accidental possibility
- Alicia Finch (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, Northern Illinois University, 915 Zulauf Hall, Dekalb, IL, 60115, USA