Dubious objections from iterated conjunctions
- Matthew A. Benton
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The knowledge account of assertion (KAA)—roughly: one should not assert what one does not know—can explain a variety of Moorean conjunctions, a fact often cited as evidence in its favor. David Sosa has objected that the account does not generalize satisfactorily, since it cannot explain the infelicity of certain iterated conjunctions without appealing to the controversial “KK” principle. This essay responds by showing how the knowledge account can handle such conjunctions without use of the KK principle.
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- Dubious objections from iterated conjunctions
Volume 162, Issue 2 , pp 355-358
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Norms of assertion
- Knowledge account
- G. E. Moore
- D. Sosa
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Philosophy Department, Rutgers University, 1 Seminary Place, New Brunswick, NJ, 08901, USA