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Rule consequentialism and disasters

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Abstract

Rule consequentialism (RC) is the view that it is right for A to do F in C if and only if A’s doing F in C is in accordance with the set of rules which, if accepted by all, would have consequences which are better than any alternative set of rules (i.e., the ideal code). I defend RC from two related objections. The first objection claims that RC requires obedience to the ideal code even if doing so has disastrous results. Though some rule consequentialists embrace a disaster-clause which permits agents to disregard some of the rules in the ideal code as a necessary means of avoiding disasters, they have not adequately explained how this clause works. I offer such an explanation and show how it fits naturally with the rest of RC. The second disaster objection asserts that even if RC can legitimately invoke a disaster-clause, it lacks principled grounds from distinguishing disasters from non-disasters. In response, I explore Hooker’s suggestion that “disaster” is vague. I contend that every plausible ethical theory must invoke something similar to a disaster clause. So if “disaster” is vague, then every plausible ethical theory faces a difficulty with it. As a result, this vagueness is not a reason to prefer other theories to RC. However, I argue, contra Hooker, that the sense of “disaster” relevant to RC is not vague, and RC does indeed have principled grounds to distinguish disasters from non-disasters.

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Notes

  1. For helpful discussion of some of the varieties of consequentialism, see Brink (2006) and Sinnott-Armstrong (2006).

  2. On our ordinary conception of morality, see what Parfit (1984, pp. 95–116) calls “Common-Sense morality” or simply “M,” what Kagan (1989, pp. 1–46) calls “ordinary morality,” and what is often called “folk morality” by those working in and around experimental philosophy such as Knobe (2003).

  3. In this paper, I limit myself to discussion of agent-based restrictions and do not address the parallel issue of agent-based prerogatives.

  4. For discussions of alternative forms of indirect consequentialism, see e.g., Adams (1976), Railton (1988), Crisp (1992), Brandt (1996), and—despite her own characterization—Driver (2003).

  5. I omit all page numbers from references to this forthcoming book since I have only an MS copy of it.

  6. A highly abbreviated list of philosophers working on rule consequentialism (or something very similar) includes Harsanyi (1977), Brandt (1979), Hooker (2000), Mulgan (2006; though compare his 2001, especially Chaps. 3 and 8), Ridge (2006), Parfit (2011), as well as Kahn (Unpublished 1) and Kahn (Unpublished 2).

  7. Compare, e.g., Brandt (1979, pp. 193–199), Hooker (2000, p. 32), and Mulgan (2006, p. 184).

  8. E.g., Kagan (1989, p. 37) and Brandt (1996, pp. 145–155).

  9. Obviously, more realistic thought experiments of this sort are possible, but they require much more qualification and take up considerably more room as a result. So I avoid them here. I turn to variations of Torture-1 in Sect. 4.

  10. Also see Smart (1956), Foot (1985), Brandt (1979, pp. 278–285), Parfit (1984, pp. 30–31), Foot (1985), Brink (1989, p. 237), Kagan (1989, pp. 36–37, 1998, pp. 231–232), and de Lazari-Radek and Singer (2010).

  11. This is the model suggested in Hooker (2008). See also Kagan (1998, p. 232).

  12. See, e.g., Brandt (1979, p. 181), Kagan (1989, p. 37), and Hooker (2000, pp. 78–80).

  13. This is the model suggested in Hooker (2000, pp. 98–99).

  14. See especially Williams (1985, pp. 185–187) and Brandt (1996, pp. 70–71). I discuss this point at length in Kahn (2011) and Kahn (Forthcoming).

  15. I omit all page numbers from references to this paper since at the moment I lack access to the journal and have only an text copy of it. See also Harrison (1979), Lyons (1994), and de Lazari-Radek and Singer (2010).

  16. Lyons (1965). The literature on this subject is too large to cite in any detail here, but for an overview of more recent work see Kagan (1998, pp. 225–230), Hooker (2000, pp. 93–99), and Mulgan (2006, pp. 137–140).

  17. Also see Driver (2002), Mulgan (2006, especially, pp. 301–339), and Hooker (2009).

  18. Beginning, it seems to me, primarily with Williamson (1994).

  19. Discussed, e.g., by Smart (1956), Kagan (1989, pp. 32–37), and Darwall (1998, p. 137).

  20. See also Hare (1981, p. 150), Parfit (1984, Chapts. 1, 4, and 5), Railton (1988, pp. 168–174), Brink (1989, pp. 216–217), Brandt (1996, pp. 142–145), and Kagan (1998, pp. 68, 70, and 224).

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Acknowledgement

I am very grateful to Dale Miller for his helpful comments on this paper.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, United States Air Force Academy, 2354 Fairchild Drive, USAF Academy, CO, 80840-6256, USA

    Leonard Kahn

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Kahn, L. Rule consequentialism and disasters. Philos Stud 162, 219–236 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9756-8

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