Modelling vagueness: what can we ignore?
- Rosanna Keefe
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A theory of vagueness gives a model of vague language and of reasoning within the language. Among the models that have been offered are Degree Theorists’ numerical models that assign values between 0 and 1 to sentences, rather than simply modelling sentences as true or false. In this paper, I ask whether we can benefit from employing a rich, well-understood numerical framework, while ignoring those aspects of it that impute a level of mathematical precision that is not present in the modelled phenomenon of vagueness. Can we ignore apparent implications for the phenomena by pointing out that it is “just a model” and that the unwanted features are mere artefacts? I explore the distinction between representors and artefacts and criticise the strategy of appealing to features as mere artefacts in defence of a theory. I focus largely on theories using numerical resources, but also consider other, related theories and strategies, including theories appealing to non-linear structures.
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- Modelling vagueness: what can we ignore?
Volume 161, Issue 3 , pp 453-470
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
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- Sorites paradox
- Degree theories
- Rosanna Keefe (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, 45 Victoria Street, Sheffield, S3 7QB, UK