Stage theory and proper names
- Pablo Rychter
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In the contemporary debate about the nature of persistence, stage theory is the view that ordinary objects (artefacts, animals, persons, etc.) are instantaneous and “persist” by being suitably related to other instantaneous objects. In this paper I focus on the issue of what stage theorists should say about the semantics of ordinary proper names, like ‘Socrates’ or ‘London’. I consider the remarks that stage theorists actually make about this issue, present some problems they face, and finally offer what I take to be the best alternative available for them.
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- Stage theory and proper names
Volume 161, Issue 3 , pp 367-379
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- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
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- Stage theory
- Counterpart theory
- Proper names
- Pablo Rychter (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Departament de Metafísica i Teoria del Coneixement, Universitat de València, Av. Blasco Ibáñez, 30, 46010, València, Spain