, Volume 154, Issue 3, pp 465-477
Date: 17 May 2011

Reply to critics

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1.

I am very grateful to Harman, Wallace, and Scanlon for their kind words and for the close attention they paid to Normativity.

I thank Harman for his very good summary of the text, and for the comments he makes along the way. I mention in particular his comments on my claim that the turn to reasons for action in moral philosophy in the 1950s was a mistake. Since both Wallace and Scanlon reject that claim, I will discuss it in section 9 below, and I will at that point return to Harman: his concluding paragraph responds to a temptation that I take to be one of the two major sources of the attraction that that turn has had for so many moral philosophers.

2.

Wallace makes a great many objections; I have space to respond to only five of them. (I squeeze brief responses to two more, into footnotes 2 and 3.)

By way of background, I said at the outset that normative judgments divide into evaluatives and directives. I said later that the directives include all normative judgments of the form “X ou