Presentism, and speaking of the dead
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.Get Access
Presentists standardly conform to the eternalist’s paradigm of treating all cases of property-exemplification as involving a single relation of instantiation. This, we argue, results in a much less parsimonious and philosophically explanatory picture than is possible if other alternatives are considered. We argue that by committing to primitive past and future tensed instantiation ties, presentists can make gains in both economy and explanatory power. We show how this metaphysical picture plays out in cases where an individual exists to partake in facts about its past and future, and also in cases where that individual no longer exists, and proxies (or surrogates) for that thing must be found.
- Bigelow, J. (1996). Presentism and properties. Philosophical Perspectives, 10, 35–52.
- Chisholm, R. (1990). Referring to things that no longer exist. Philosophical Perspectives, 4, 545–556. CrossRef
- Johnston, M. (1987). Is there a problem about persistence? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 61(Suppl.), 107–135.
- Keller, S. (2004). Presentism and truthmaking. In D. W. Zimmerman (Ed.), Oxford studies in metaphysics (Vol. 1, pp. 83–104). Oxford: Clarendon.
- Lewis, D. (1986). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Rhoda, A. R. (2009). Presentism, truthmakers, and God. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 90, 41–62. CrossRef
- Presentism, and speaking of the dead
Volume 160, Issue 2 , pp 253-263
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links