Does Mary know I experience plus rather than quus? A new hard problem
- Philip Goff
- … show all 1 hide
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.Get Access
Realism about cognitive or semantic phenomenology, the view that certain conscious states are intrinsically such as to ground thought or understanding, is increasingly being taken seriously in analytic philosophy. The principle aim of this paper is to argue that it is extremely difficult to be a physicalist about cognitive phenomenology. The general trend in later 20th century/early 21st century philosophy of mind has been to account for the content of thought in terms of facts outside the head of the thinker at the time of thought, e.g. in terms of causal relations between thinker and world, or in terms of the natural purposes for which mental representations have developed. However, on the assumption that consciousness is constitutively realised by what is going on inside the head of a thinker at the time of experience, the content of cognitive phenomenology cannot be accounted for in this way. Furthermore, any internalist account of content is particularly susceptible to Kripkensteinian rule following worries. It seems that if someone knew all the physical facts about what is going on in my head at the time I was having a given experience with cognitive phenomenology, they would not thereby know whether that state had ‘straight’ rather than ‘quus-like’ content, e.g. whether the experience was intrinsically such as the ground the thought that two plus two equals four or intrinsically such as to ground the thought that two quus two equals four. The project of naturalising consciousness is much harder for realists about cognitive phenomenology.
- Bayne, T., & Montague, M. (Eds.). (forthcoming). Cognitive phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Carruthers, P. (2000). Phenomenal consciousness: A naturalistic theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. CrossRef
- Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The conscious mind: Towards a fundamental theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dretske, F. (1988). Explaining behaviour. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Dretske, F. (1994). If you can’t make one, you don’t know how it works. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 19, 468–482. CrossRef
- Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Fodor, J. (1990). Theory of content and other essays. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Horgan, T., & Kriegal, U. (Eds.). (forthcoming). Phenomenal intentionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Horgan, T., & Tienson, J. (2002). The intentionality of phenomenology and the phenomenology of intentionality. In D. J. Chalmers (Ed.), Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly, 32(127), 127–136. CrossRef
- Jackson, F. (1986). What Mary didn’t know. Journal of Philosophy, 83(5), 291–295. CrossRef
- Jackson, F. (1998). From metaphysics to ethics: A defence of conceptual analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Kripke, S. (1982). Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Lewis, D. (1983). New work for a theory of universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61(4), 343–377. CrossRef
- Lycan, W. (1996). Consciousness and experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Millikan, R. (1984). Language, thought and other biological categories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Millikan, R. (1989). Biosemantics. Journal of Philosophy, 86(6), 281–297. CrossRef
- Papineau, D. (1984). Representation and explanation. Philosophy of Science, 51(4), 550–572. CrossRef
- Papineau, D. (1993). Philosophical naturalism. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Pitt, D. (2004). The phenomenology of cognition or ‘What is it like to think that P?’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69(1), 1–36. CrossRef
- Putnam, H. (1975). The meaning of meaning. In his language, meaning and reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Siewart, C. (1998). The significance of consciousness. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Siewart, C. (forthcoming). Phenomenal thought, in Bayne and Montague.
- Strawson, P. F. (1979). Perception and its objects. In G. F. Macdonald (Ed.), Perception and identity: Essays presented to A. J. Ayer. London: Macmillan.
- Strawson, G. (1994). Mental reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Strawson, G. (2008). Real intentionality 3: Why intentionality entails consciousness. In his real materialism and other essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tye, M. (2009). Consciousness revisited. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Does Mary know I experience plus rather than quus? A new hard problem
Volume 160, Issue 2 , pp 223-235
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Hard problem
- The knowledge argument
- Cognitive phenomenology
- Phenomenal intentionality
- Philip Goff (1) (2)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. University of Hertfordshire, Hertfordshire, UK
- 2. King’s College London, London, UK