Normative uncertainty for non-cognitivists
- Andrew Sepielli
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Normative judgments involve two gradable features. First, the judgments themselves can come in degrees; second, the strength of reasons represented in the judgments can come in degrees. Michael Smith has argued that non-cognitivism cannot accommodate both of these gradable dimensions. The degrees of a non-cognitive state can stand in for degrees of judgment, or degrees of reason strength represented in judgment, but not both. I argue that (a) there are brands of noncognitivism that can surmount Smith’s challenge, and (b) any brand of non-cognitivism that has even a chance of solving the Frege–Geach Problem and some related problems involving probabilistic consistency can also thereby solve Smith’s problem. Because only versions of non-cognitivism that can solve the Frege–Geach Problem are otherwise plausible, all otherwise plausible versions of noncognitivism can meet Smith’s challenge.
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- Normative uncertainty for non-cognitivists
Volume 160, Issue 2 , pp 191-207
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- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
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- Normative uncertainty
- Frege–Geach Problem
- Michael Smith
- Andrew Sepielli (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada