Is there a fact of the matter between direct reference theory and (neo-)Fregeanism?
- Mark Balaguer
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It is argued here that there is no fact of the matter between direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism. To get a more precise idea of the central thesis of this paper, consider the following two claims: (i) While direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism can be developed in numerous ways, they can be developed in essentially parallel ways; that is, for any (plausible) way of developing direct reference theory, there is an essentially parallel way of developing neo-Fregeanism, and vice versa. And (ii) for each such pair of theories, there is no fact of the matter as to which of them is superior; or more precisely, they are tied in terms of factual accuracy. These are sweeping claims that cannot be fully justified in a single paper. But arguments are given here that motivate these theses, i.e., that suggest that they are very likely true.
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- Is there a fact of the matter between direct reference theory and (neo-)Fregeanism?
Volume 154, Issue 1 , pp 53-78
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
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- Direct reference theory
- Factual emptiness
- Facts of the matter
- Belief reports
- Mark Balaguer (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, California State University, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, USA