Is pluralism about truth inherently unstable?
- Cory D. WrightAffiliated withDepartment of Philosophy, California State University, Long Beach Email author
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.Get Access
Although it’s sometimes thought that pluralism about truth is unstable—or, worse, just a non-starter—it’s surprisingly difficult to locate collapsing arguments that conclusively demonstrate either its instability or its inability to get started. This paper exemplifies the point by examining three recent arguments to that effect. However, it ends with a cautionary tale; for pluralism may not be any better off than other traditional theories that face various technical objections, and may be worse off in facing them all.
KeywordsTruth Pluralism Property Instability Scope problem Reductive analysis Uniformity assumption Disjunctivism
- Is pluralism about truth inherently unstable?
Volume 159, Issue 1 , pp 89-105
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Scope problem
- Reductive analysis
- Uniformity assumption
- Cory D. Wright (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, California State University, Long Beach, McIntosh Humanities Building (917), 1250 Bellflower Boulevard, Long Beach, CA, 90840-2408, USA