Philosophical Studies

, Volume 159, Issue 1, pp 89–105

Is pluralism about truth inherently unstable?

Authors

    • Department of PhilosophyCalifornia State University, Long Beach
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-010-9691-0

Cite this article as:
Wright, C.D. Philos Stud (2012) 159: 89. doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9691-0

Abstract

Although it’s sometimes thought that pluralism about truth is unstable—or, worse, just a non-starter—it’s surprisingly difficult to locate collapsing arguments that conclusively demonstrate either its instability or its inability to get started. This paper exemplifies the point by examining three recent arguments to that effect. However, it ends with a cautionary tale; for pluralism may not be any better off than other traditional theories that face various technical objections, and may be worse off in facing them all.

Keywords

TruthPluralismPropertyInstabilityScope problemReductive analysisUniformity assumptionDisjunctivism

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011