Philosophical Studies

, Volume 159, Issue 1, pp 89–105

Is pluralism about truth inherently unstable?


DOI: 10.1007/s11098-010-9691-0

Cite this article as:
Wright, C.D. Philos Stud (2012) 159: 89. doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9691-0


Although it’s sometimes thought that pluralism about truth is unstable—or, worse, just a non-starter—it’s surprisingly difficult to locate collapsing arguments that conclusively demonstrate either its instability or its inability to get started. This paper exemplifies the point by examining three recent arguments to that effect. However, it ends with a cautionary tale; for pluralism may not be any better off than other traditional theories that face various technical objections, and may be worse off in facing them all.


TruthPluralismPropertyInstabilityScope problemReductive analysisUniformity assumptionDisjunctivism

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyCalifornia State University, Long BeachLong BeachUSA