Philosophical Studies

, Volume 159, Issue 1, pp 89-105

First online:

Is pluralism about truth inherently unstable?

  • Cory D. WrightAffiliated withDepartment of Philosophy, California State University, Long Beach Email author 

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Although it’s sometimes thought that pluralism about truth is unstable—or, worse, just a non-starter—it’s surprisingly difficult to locate collapsing arguments that conclusively demonstrate either its instability or its inability to get started. This paper exemplifies the point by examining three recent arguments to that effect. However, it ends with a cautionary tale; for pluralism may not be any better off than other traditional theories that face various technical objections, and may be worse off in facing them all.


Truth Pluralism Property Instability Scope problem Reductive analysis Uniformity assumption Disjunctivism