, Volume 156, Issue 3, pp 421-431
Date: 14 Jan 2011

Relativistic content and disagreement

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Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne’s Relativism and Monadic Truth presses a number of worries about relativistic content.

Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009) Subsequent references are indicated parenthetically. By relativistic content, I mean that which is truth evaluable, is the object of attitudes like assertion and belief, and (is the sort of thing) whose truth value is relative to something that is not fixed simply by picking a possible world.

It forces one to think carefully about what a relativist should mean by saying that speakers disagree or contradict one another in asserting such content. My focus is on this question, though at points (in particular in Sect. 4) I touch on other issues Cappelen and Hawthorne (CH) raise.

In what follows I say nothing about the discussion in CH’s Chapter 3 of “temporally neutral” content. I agree with the spirit of much of what they say there (though not with everything they say about some of my juvenilia). I agree in particular that an adequate accou