Logical knowledge and ordinary reasoning
First Online: 03 December 2010 DOI:
10.1007/s11098-010-9672-3 Cite this article as: Besson, C. Philos Stud (2012) 158: 59. doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9672-3 Abstract
This paper argues that the prominent accounts of logical knowledge have the consequence that they conflict with ordinary reasoning. On these accounts knowing a logical principle, for instance, is having a disposition to infer according to it. These accounts in particular conflict with so-called ‘reasoned change in view’, where someone does not infer according to a logical principle but revise their views instead. The paper also outlines a propositional account of logical knowledge which does not conflict with ordinary reasoning.
Keywords Logical knowledge Ordinary reasoning Harman Dispositions Single-track Multi-track Blameless but blind reasoning Propositional knowledge References
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