, Volume 156, Issue 3, pp 417-419,
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Reply to Lasersohn, MacFarlane, and Richard

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Précis of Relativism and Monadic Truth

The beginning of the 21st century saw something of a comeback for relativism within analytical philosophy. Relativism and Monadic Truth has three main goals. First, we wished to clarify what we take to be the key moving parts in the intellectual machinations of self-described relativists. Second, we aimed to expose fundamental flaws in those argumentative strategies that drive the pro-relativist movement and precursors from which they draw inspiration. Third, we hoped that our polemic would serve as an indirect defence of a traditional and natural picture concerning truth. According to this picture, what we call ‘Simplicity’, the fundamental structure of semantic reality is best revealed by construing truth as a simple monadic property of propositions that serve as the objects of belief, assertion, meaning and agreement.

Our project was not a straightforward one. So-called relativists are not uniform in their key ideology, are often sloppy, casual,