Philosophical Studies

, Volume 154, Issue 1, pp 27–51

Endurantist and perdurantist accounts of persistence

Authors

    • Department of PhilosophyUniversity at Buffalo
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-010-9526-z

Cite this article as:
Donnelly, M. Philos Stud (2011) 154: 27. doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9526-z

Abstract

In this paper, I focus on three issues intertwined in current debates between endurantists and perdurantists—(i) the dimension of persisting objects, (ii) whether persisting objects have timeless, or only time-relative, parts, and (iii) whether persisting objects have proper temporal parts. I argue that one standard endurantist position on the first issue is compatible with standard perdurantist positions on parthood and temporal parts. I further argue that different accounts of persistence depend on the claims about objects’ dimensions and not on the auxiliary claims about parthood and temporal parts.

Keywords

PersistenceEndurantismPerdurantismThree-dimensionalismFour-dimensionalismTemporal partsParthood

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010