Philosophical Studies

, Volume 153, Issue 3, pp 351–364

Van Inwagen’s modal skepticism

Authors

    • Department of PhilosophyUniversity of the Witwatersrand
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-010-9520-5

Cite this article as:
Hawke, P. Philos Stud (2011) 153: 351. doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9520-5

Abstract

In this paper, the author defends Peter van Inwagen’s modal skepticism. Van Inwagen accepts that we have much basic, everyday modal knowledge, but denies that we have the capacity to justify philosophically interesting modal claims that are far removed from this basic knowledge. The author also defends the argument by means of which van Inwagen supports his modal skepticism, offering a rebuttal to an objection along the lines of that proposed by Geirrson. Van Inwagen argues that Stephen Yablo’s recent and influential account of the relationship between conceivability and possibility supports his skeptical claims. The author’s defence involves a creative interpretation and development of Yablo’s account, which results in a recursive account of modal epistemology, what the author calls the “safe explanation” theory of modal epistemology.

Keywords

SkepticismModalityModal epistemologyYablovan Inwagen

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010