Philosophical Studies

, Volume 153, Issue 3, pp 397–415

Second-order properties and three varieties of functionalism

Authors

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-010-9518-z

Cite this article as:
Hiddleston, E. Philos Stud (2011) 153: 397. doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9518-z

Abstract

This paper investigates whether there is an acceptable version of Functionalism that avoids commitment to second-order properties. I argue that the answer is “no”. I consider two reductionist versions of Functionalism, and argue that both are compatible with multiple realization as such. There is a more specific type of multiple realization that poses difficulties for these views, however. The only apparent Functionalist solution is to accept second-order properties.

Keywords

Reduction Functionalism Mental property Second-order property Functional property Metaphysics

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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010