, Volume 153, Issue 2, pp 313-333
Date: 20 Jan 2010

The nature of intuitive justification

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In this paper I articulate and defend a view that I call phenomenal dogmatism about intuitive justification. It is dogmatic because it includes the thesis: if it intuitively seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. It is phenomenalist because it includes the thesis: intuitions justify us in believing their contents in virtue of their phenomenology—and in particular their presentational phenomenology. I explore the nature of presentational phenomenology as it occurs perception, and I make a case for thinking that it is present in a wide variety of logical, mathematical, and philosophical intuitions.

Thanks to Yuval Avnur, Selim Berker, Sinan Dogramaci, Ned Hall, Charles Parsons, Jim Pryor, Susanna Siegel, and Alison Simmons for helpful discussion of earlier versions of this work.