Pereboom on the Frankfurt cases
- David Palmer
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According to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. In what follows, I want to defend this principle against an apparent counterexample offered recently by Derk Pereboom (Living without free will, 2001; Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29:228–247, 2005). Pereboom’s case, a variant of what are known as ‘Frankfurt cases,’ is important for it attempts to overcome a dilemma posed for earlier alleged counterexamples to PAP. However, I will argue that by paying closer attention to the details of Pereboom’s example, we see that his example fails to show a way between the horns of the dilemma posed for the earlier Frankfurt examples.
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- Pereboom on the Frankfurt cases
Volume 153, Issue 2 , pp 261-272
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
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- Moral responsibility
- Free will
- David Palmer (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 801 McClung Tower, Knoxville, TN, 37996, USA