Philosophical Studies

, Volume 153, Issue 2, pp 183–211

The great beetle debate: a study in imagining with names

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-009-9485-4

Cite this article as:
Friend, S. Philos Stud (2011) 153: 183. doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9485-4

Abstract

Statements about fictional characters, such as “Gregor Samsa has been changed into a beetle,” pose the problem of how we can say something true (or false) using empty names. I propose an original solution to this problem that construes such utterances as reports of the “prescriptions to imagine” generated by works of fiction. In particular, I argue that we should construe these utterances as specifying, not what we are supposed to imagine—the propositional object of the imagining—but how we are supposed to imagine. Most other theories of thought and discourse about fictional characters either fail to capture the intentionality of our imaginings, or else obscure the differences between imaginings directed toward fictional characters and those directed toward real individuals. I argue that once we have an account of prescriptions to imagine about real individuals, we can adapt the same framework to specify the contents of prescriptions to imagine about fictional characters, and thereby to account for the truth (or falsity) of statements about fictional characters.

Keywords

Fictional referenceEmpty namesImaginationPrescriptions to imagineKendall WaltonJohn PerryFictional charactersTruth in fictionNotion networks

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, Heythrop CollegeUniversity of LondonLondonUK