The A-theory of time and induction
- Alexander R. Pruss
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The A-theory of time says that it is an objective, non-perspectival fact about the world that some events are present, while others were present or will be present. I shall argue that the A-theory has some implausible consequences for inductive reasoning. In particular, the presentist version of the A-theory, which holds that the difference between the present and the non-present consists in the present events being the only ones that exist, is very much in trouble.
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- Rhoda, A. R., Gregory, G. A., & Belt, T. G. (2006). Open theism, omniscience, and the nature of the future. Faith and Philosophy, 23, 432–459.
- The A-theory of time and induction
Volume 152, Issue 3 , pp 335-345
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- Springer Netherlands
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- 1. Department of Philosophy, Baylor University, One Bear Place #97273, Waco, TX, 76798-7273, USA