Philosophical Studies

, Volume 151, Issue 3, pp 421–432

The buck-passing account of value: lessons from Crisp


DOI: 10.1007/s11098-009-9461-z

Cite this article as:
Liao, S.M. Philos Stud (2010) 151: 421. doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9461-z


T. M. Scanlon’s buck-passing account of value (BPA) has been subjected to a barrage of criticisms. Recently, to be helpful to BPA, Roger Crisp has suggested that a number of these criticisms can be met if one makes some revisions to BPA. In this paper, I argue that if advocates of the buck-passing account accepted these revisions, they would effectively be giving up the buck-passing account as it is typically understood, that is, as an account concerned with the conceptual priority of reasons or the right vis-à-vis value or the good. I conclude by addressing some of the broader implications of my arguments for the current debate about the buck-passing account of value.


Buck-passing account of value Roger Crisp Reasons and value T. M. Scanlon 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of PhilosophyOxford UniversityOxfordUK

Personalised recommendations