Philosophical Studies

, Volume 152, Issue 1, pp 135–154

In support of anti-intellectualism

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-009-9459-6

Cite this article as:
Kumar, V. Philos Stud (2011) 152: 135. doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9459-6

Abstract

Intellectualist theories attempt to assimilate know how to propositional knowledge and, in so doing, fail to properly explain the close relation know how bears to action. I develop here an anti-intellectualist theory that is warranted, I argue, because it best accounts for the difference between know how and mere “armchair knowledge.” Know how is a mental state characterized by a certain world-to-mind direction of fit (though it is non-motivational) and attendant functional role. It is essential of know how, but not propositional knowledge, that it makes possible performance errors and has the functional role of guiding action. The theory is attractive, in part, because it allows for propositional, non-propositional and perhaps even non-representational varieties of know how.

Keywords

Know how Propositional knowledge Intellectualism Direction of fit Functional role Performance errors 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of ArizonaTucsonUSA