- Selim Berker
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After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta’s account of perceptual justification in his book Empiricism and Experience, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta’s proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; (2) there is a major lacuna in Gupta’s account of how convergence in light of experience yields absolute entitlements to form beliefs; and (3) Gupta has not adequately explained how ordinary courses of experience can lead to convergence on a commonsense view of the world.
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Volume 152, Issue 1 , pp 17-39
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- Selim Berker (1)
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- 1. Department of Philosophy, Harvard University, Emerson Hall, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA