, Volume 145, Issue 3, pp 465-476
Date: 15 Apr 2009

Replies to Ichikawa, Martin and Weinberg

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Reply to Ichikawa

The Philosophy of Philosophy analyses the Gettier thought experiment as an argument whose major premise is a counterfactual conditional. In ‘Knowing the Intuition and Knowing the Counterfactual’, Jonathan Ichikawa objects that this misrepresents the thought experiment as more accident-prone than it really is. If the world does not cooperate, the counterfactual will fail: it will be false that if the Gettier text had been realized, there would have been justified true belief without knowledge. Even if the world cooperates enough to make the counterfactual true, it may still not cooperate enough to enable us to know it, if it could too easily have been false. Ichikawa denies that the thought experiment is such a hostage to empirical fortune. The Philosophy of Philosophy considers such objections, arguing that although the thought experiment is indeed not immune to misfortune, that should not drive us to scepticism. If we identify an unwanted way in which the Gettier text ...