Virtuous intuitions: comments on Lecture 3 of Ernest Sosa’s A Virtue Epistemology
- First Online:
- Cite this article as:
- Boghossian, P. Philos Stud (2009) 144: 111. doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9379-5
- 120 Views
I agree with Sosa that intuitions are best thought of as attractions to believe a certain proposition merely on the basis of understanding it. However, I don’t think it is constitutive of them that they supply strictly foundational justification for the propositions they justify, though I do believe that it is important that the intuition of a suitable subject be thought of as a prima facie justification for his intuitive judgment, independently of the reliability of his underlying capacities. I also think that we need to be able to explain how mere understanding of a proposition can confer upon us an ability to have reliable intuitions, that we cannot simply take that idea for granted. And that when try to explain that, our best avenue for doing so is to take the intuitions as constituting the understanding of which they are said to be a manifestation.