Philosophical Studies

, Volume 144, Issue 1, pp 121–125

Knowledge as aptness

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-009-9376-8

Cite this article as:
Cohen, S. Philos Stud (2009) 144: 121. doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9376-8
  • 68 Views

Abstract

I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.

Keywords

AptnessCompetenceReflective knowledgeDreaming skepticism

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosopyArizona State UniversityTempeUSA