, Volume 144, Issue 1, pp 35-44
Date: 27 Mar 2009

Libertarianism

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My purpose in this symposium, part of a discussion of four competing views of free will is to defend the libertarian view of free will that I have been developing over the past several decades. According to that view, free will is incompatible with determinism. I argue for this incompatibility on grounds that free will requires ultimate responsibility for our actions, i.e., the power to be ultimate originators of at least some of our own ends or purposes. I argue further that this view of free will can be reconciled with modern science against criticisms that it does not allow sufficient control, reduces to mere chance or luck, and other criticisms. In the process, I discuss questions about the nature of action, moral responsibility, choice, effort, rationality and other notions commonly associated with the freedom of the will, free will, moral responsibility, incompatibilism, libertarian view of free will, effort, will, self-forming actions (SFAs), alternative possibilities, luck, cha ...