- Robert Kane
- … show all 1 hide
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.Get Access
My purpose in this symposium, part of a discussion of four competing views of free will is to defend the libertarian view of free will that I have been developing over the past several decades. According to that view, free will is incompatible with determinism. I argue for this incompatibility on grounds that free will requires ultimate responsibility for our actions, i.e., the power to be ultimate originators of at least some of our own ends or purposes. I argue further that this view of free will can be reconciled with modern science against criticisms that it does not allow sufficient control, reduces to mere chance or luck, and other criticisms. In the process, I discuss questions about the nature of action, moral responsibility, choice, effort, rationality and other notions commonly associated with the freedom of the will, free will, moral responsibility, incompatibilism, libertarian view of free will, effort, will, self-forming actions (SFAs), alternative possibilities, luck, cha
- Anscombe, G. E. M. (1971). Causality and determinism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Austin, J. L. (1961). Ifs and cans. In J. O. Urmson & G. Warnock (Eds.), Philosophical papers (pp. 153–180). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Churchland, P. M. (1996). The engine of reason, the seat of the soul. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Spitzer, M. (1999). The mind within the net. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Volume 144, Issue 1 , pp 35-44
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Robert Kane (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, The University of Texas at Austin, Waggener Hall 316, Austin, TX, 78712-1180, USA