Philosophical Studies

, Volume 149, Issue 3, pp 321–326

Disagreement, equal weight and commutativity

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-009-9362-1

Cite this article as:
Wilson, A. Philos Stud (2010) 149: 321. doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9362-1

Abstract

How should we respond to cases of disagreement where two epistemic agents have the same evidence but come to different conclusions? Adam Elga has provided a Bayesian framework for addressing this question. In this paper, I shall highlight two unfortunate consequences of this framework, which Elga does not anticipate. Both problems derive from a failure of commutativity between application of the equal weight view and updating in the light of other evidence.

Keywords

Disagreement Equal weight view Commutativity Averaging Credences Evidence Epistemic peer 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University CollegeUniversity of OxfordOxfordUK