Philosophical Studies

, Volume 148, Issue 2, pp 231–247

Swamp Mary’s revenge: deviant phenomenal knowledge and physicalism

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-008-9322-1

Cite this article as:
Mandik, P. Philos Stud (2010) 148: 231. doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9322-1

Abstract

Deviant phenomenal knowledge is knowing what it’s like to have experiences of, e.g., red without actually having had experiences of red. Such a knower is a deviant. Some physicalists have argued and some anti-physicalists have denied that the possibility of deviants undermines anti-physicalism and the Knowledge Argument. The current paper presents new arguments defending the deviant-based attacks on anti-physicalism. Central to my arguments are considerations concerning the psychosemantic underpinnings of deviant phenomenal knowledge. I argue that physicalists are in a superior position to account for the conditions in virtue of which states of deviants constitute representations of phenomenal facts.

Keywords

Phenomenal knowledge Physicalism Knowledge argument Psychosemantics 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.William Paterson UniversityWayneUSA