Philosophical Studies

, Volume 141, Issue 1, pp 7–19

Truthmaker commitments


DOI: 10.1007/s11098-008-9260-y

Cite this article as:
Schaffer, J. Philos Stud (2008) 141: 7. doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9260-y


On the truthmaker view of ontological commitment [Heil (From an ontological point of view, 2003); Armstrong (Truth and truthmakers, 2004); Cameron (Philosophical Studies, 2008)], a theory is committed to the entities needed in the world for the theory to be made true. I argue that this view puts truthmaking to the wrong task. None of the leading accounts of truthmaking—via necessitation, supervenience, or grounding—can provide a viable measure of ontological commitment. But the grounding account does provide a needed constraint on what is fundamental. So I conclude that truthmaker commitments are not a rival to quantifier commitments, but a needed complement. The quantifier commitments are what a theory says exists, while the truthmaker commitments are what a theory says is fundamental.



Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy RSSSAustralian National UniversityCanberraAustralia