Philosophical Studies

, Volume 146, Issue 3, pp 327-348

First online:

I won’t do it! Self-prediction, moral obligation and moral deliberation

  • Jennie LouiseAffiliated withDiscipline of Philosophy, University of Adelaide Email author 

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This paper considers the question of whether predictions of wrongdoing are relevant to our moral obligations. After giving an analysis of ‘won’t’ claims (i.e., claims that an agent won’t Φ), the question is separated into two different issues: firstly, whether predictions of wrongdoing affect our objective moral obligations, and secondly, whether self-prediction of wrongdoing can be legitimately used in moral deliberation. I argue for an affirmative answer to both questions, although there are conditions that must be met for self-prediction to be appropriate in deliberation. The discussion illuminates an interesting and significant tension between agency and prediction.


Actualism Possibilism Prediction Wrongdoing Obligation