Philosophical Studies

, Volume 140, Issue 1, pp 135–148

Essentiality conferred


DOI: 10.1007/s11098-008-9230-4

Cite this article as:
Sveinsdóttir, Á. Philos Stud (2008) 140: 135. doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9230-4


In this article I introduce a certain kind of anti-realist account of what makes a property essential to an object and defend it against likely objections. This account, which I call a ‘conferralist’ account, shares some of the attractive features of other anti-realist accounts, such as conventionalism and expressivism, but I believe, not their respective drawbacks.



Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophySan Francisco State UniversitySan FranciscoUSA