A defense of local miracle compatibilism Article
First Online: 09 April 2008 Received: 01 October 2007 Revised: 01 February 2008 Accepted: 01 March 2008 DOI :
10.1007/s11098-008-9226-0
Cite this article as: Graham, P.A. Philos Stud (2008) 140: 65. doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9226-0 Abstract David Lewis has offered a reply to the standard argument for the claim that the truth of determinism is incompatible with anyone’s being able to do otherwise than she in fact does. Helen Beebee has argued that Lewis’s compatibilist strategy is untenable. In this paper I show that one recent attempt to defend Lewis’s view against this argument fails and then go on to offer my own defense of Lewis’s view.
Keywords Compatibilism Incompatibilism Free Will Ability
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Authors and Affiliations 1. Department of Philosophy University of Massachusetts, Amherst Amherst MA USA