Philosophical Studies

, Volume 140, Issue 1, pp 1–18

Truthmakers and ontological commitment: or how to deal with complex objects and mathematical ontology without getting into trouble

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-008-9223-3

Cite this article as:
Cameron, R.P. Philos Stud (2008) 140: 1. doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9223-3

Abstract

What are the ontological commitments of a sentence? In this paper I offer an answer from the perspective of the truthmaker theorist that contrasts with the familiar Quinean criterion. I detail some of the benefits of thinking of things this way: they include making the composition debate tractable without appealing to a neo-Carnapian metaontology, making sense of neo-Fregeanism, and dispensing with some otherwise recalcitrant necessary connections.

Keywords

Ontological Commitment Fundamentality Metaontology Composition Neo-Fregeanism 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of LeedsLeedsUK

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