The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem
- Andrew Reisner
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In this paper I argue against the stronger of the two views concerning the right and wrong kind of reasons for belief, i.e. the view that the only genuine normative reasons for belief are evidential. The project in this paper is primarily negative, but with an ultimately positive aim. That aim is to leave room for the possibility that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief. Work is required to make room for this view, because evidentialism of a strict variety remains the default view in much of the debate concerning normative reasons for belief. Strict versions of evidentialism are inconsistent with the view that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief.
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- The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem
Volume 145, Issue 2 , pp 257-272
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- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
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- Wrong kind of reasons
- Reasons for belief
- Theoretical reason
- Andrew Reisner (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, McGill University, Leacock Building, 855, rue Sherbrooke Ouest, Montreal, QC, Canada, H3A 2T7