Philosophical Studies

, Volume 140, Issue 2, pp 149–159

Reducing reductionism: on a putative proof for Extreme Haecceitism

Authors

    • PhilosophyNorth Georgia College and State University
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-007-9134-8

Cite this article as:
Catterson, T.T. Philos Stud (2008) 140: 149. doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9134-8

Abstract

Nathan Salmon, in his paper Trans-World Identification and Stipulation (1996) purports to give a proof for the claim that facts concerning trans-world identity cannot be conceptually reduced to general facts. He calls this claim ‘Extreme Haecceitism.’ I argue that his proof is fallacious. However, I also contend that the analysis and ultimate rejection of his proof clarifies the fundamental issues that are at stake in the debate between the reductionist and haecceitist solutions to the problem of trans-world identity. These issues hinge on the ability of modal logic and possible worlds semantics to draw a hard and fast distinction between the logic and the metaphysics of modal logic. I shall claim that the considerations in this paper call into question the viability of such a distinction.

Keywords

Transworld identityHaecceitismEssentialismModal metaphysicsReductionism

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007