Philosophical Studies

, Volume 137, Issue 3, pp 417–426

The ontology of meanings

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-007-9129-5

Cite this article as:
Siebel, M. Philos Stud (2008) 137: 417. doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9129-5

Abstract

In part 4 of Meaning, Expression, and Thought, Davis rejects what he calls Fregean ideational theories, according to which the meaning of an expression is an idea; and then presents his own account, which states that, e.g., the meaning of ‘Primzahl’ in German is the property of meaning prime number. Before casting doubt on the latter ontology of meanings, I come to Frege’s defence by pointing out that he was not an advocate of the position Davis named after him because Fregean senses are not lexical meanings and Fregean thoughts are not types of mental events.

Keywords

FregeMeaningPropertiesSense

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of OldenburgOldenburgGermany