Physicalism as an attitude
- Alyssa Ney
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It is widely noted that physicalism, taken as the doctrine that the world contains just what physics says it contains, faces a dilemma which, some like Tim Crane and D.H. Mellor have argued, shows that “physicalism is the wrong answer to an essentially trivial question”. I argue that both problematic horns of this dilemma drop out if one takes physicalism not to be a doctrine of the kind that might be true, false, or trivial, but instead an attitude or oath one takes to formulate one’s ontology solely according to the current posits of physics.
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- Physicalism as an attitude
Volume 138, Issue 1 , pp 1-15
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- Hempel’s dilemma
- Alyssa Ney (1)
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- 1. Philosophy, University of Rochester, Box 270078, Rochester, NY, 14627, USA