Philosophical Studies

, Volume 137, Issue 2, pp 269–300

Truth, Meaning, and Circularity


DOI: 10.1007/s11098-005-8541-y

Cite this article as:
Horisk, C. Philos Stud (2008) 137: 269. doi:10.1007/s11098-005-8541-y


It is often argued that the combination of deflationism about truth and the truth-conditional theory of meaning is impossible for reasons of circularity. I distinguish, and reject, two strains of circularity argument. Arguments of the first strain hold that the combination has a circular account of the order in which one comes to know the meaning of a sentence and comes to know its truth condition. I show that these arguments fail to identify any circularity. Arguments of the second strain hold that the combination has a circular explanation of the ideas or concepts of meaning and truth. I show that these arguments identify a genuine, but acceptable, circularity.

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© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MissouriColumbiaUSA