Greco on Reliabilism and Epistemic Luck
Cite this article as: Pritchard, D. Philos Stud (2006) 130: 35. doi:10.1007/s11098-005-3232-2 Abstract
I outline Greco’s response to the Pyrrhonian challenge to epistemic externalist theories of knowledge and offer two points of criticism. I also argue, however, that there is an account of epistemic luck available which can cast some light on the dispute that Greco is concerned with, and which could, in principle at least, be regarded as being in the spirit of the proposal that Greco sets out.
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