Philosophical Studies

, Volume 128, Issue 3, pp 539–563

Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism

Authors

    • Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Colorado at Boulder
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-004-7817-y

Cite this article as:
Heathwood, C. Philos Stud (2006) 128: 539. doi:10.1007/s11098-004-7817-y

Abstract

Hedonism and the desire-satisfaction theory of welfare (“desire satisfactionism”) are typically seen as archrivals in the contest over identifying what makes one’s life go best. It is surprising, then, that the most plausible form of hedonism just is the most plausible form of desire satisfactionism. How can a single theory of welfare be a version of both hedonism and desire satisfactionism? The answer lies in what pleasure is: pleasure is, in my view, the subjective satisfaction of desire. This thesis about pleasure is clarified and defended only after we proceed through the dialectics that get us to the most plausible forms of hedonism and desire satisfactionism.

Copyright information

© Springer 2006