Philosophical Studies

, Volume 122, Issue 2, pp 171–182

Logical Properties of Warrant

Authors

    • Philosophy DepartmentUniversity of Colorado Boulder CO
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-004-2206-0

Cite this article as:
Huemer, M. Philos Stud (2005) 122: 171. doi:10.1007/s11098-004-2206-0

Abstract

Trenton Merricks argues that on any reasonable account, warrant must entailtruth. I demonstrate three theses about the properties ofwarrant: (1) Warrant is not unique;there are many properties that satisfy the definition of warrant. (2) Warrant need not entail truth; there are some warrant properties that entailtruthand others that do not. (3) Warrant need not be closed under entailment, even if knowledge is. If knowledge satisfies closure, then some warrant properties satisfy closure while others do not;if knowledge violates closure, then allwarrant properties violate closure.

Copyright information

© Springer 2005