, Volume 12, Issue 4, pp 859-876
Date: 07 Nov 2012

An adverbialist–objectualist account of pain

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Take adverbialism, broadly construed, to be the thesis that pains (and other sensations)

In what follows I use ‘pain’ synecdochically to refer to sensations generally, i.e. to localized feelings that always have (or at least are experienced as having) a particular location in (or on) one’s body, such as pains, itches, tingles, tickles, twinges, and the like. I have very little to say about perception—seeing, hearing, etc.—and am not sanguine, in fact, about the possibility that what I say about sensation can plausibly be extended to perception.

are modes of awareness, and take objectualism, broadly construed, to be the thesis that pains are objects of awareness. Why are we inclined to say that pains are modes of awareness and yet also inclined to say that they are objects of awareness? Each inclination leads to a philosophical view that seems to be incompatible with the other. If adverbialism is correct, it would seem that objectualism is mistaken (and vice versa). And yet each inclinat