In defence of embodied cognition: a reply to Fred Adams
- Christopher Letheby
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Fred Adams (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9(4): 619–628, 2010) criticizes the theory of embodied cognition (EC) which holds that conceptual and linguistic thought is grounded in the brain’s perceptual and sensorimotor systems. Among other things, Adams claims that: (1) EC is potentially committed to an implausible criterion of sentence meaningfulness; (2) EC lacks claimed advantages over rival accounts of conceptual thought; (3) relevant experimental data do not show constitutive, but only causal, involvement of perception in conception; and (4) EC cannot account for the comprehension of abstract concepts. I respond to Adams that: (1) EC is not committed to an implausible criterion of meaningfulness, though it may be committed to holding that comprehension admits of degrees; (2) EC does have its claimed advantages over rival views; (3) the data do make a strong case for constitutive involvement and (4) a broad and comprehensive EC approach probably can account for the comprehension of abstract concepts.
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- In defence of embodied cognition: a reply to Fred Adams
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Volume 11, Issue 3 , pp 403-414
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Embodied cognition
- Symbol grounding
- Linguistic meaning
- Perceptual symbols
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Discipline of Philosophy, The University of Adelaide, Level 7, Napier Building, North Terrace Campus, Adelaide, SA, 5005, Australia