Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 11, Issue 2, pp 149–173

Seeing mind in action


DOI: 10.1007/s11097-011-9226-y

Cite this article as:
Krueger, J. Phenom Cogn Sci (2012) 11: 149. doi:10.1007/s11097-011-9226-y


Much recent work on social cognition and empathy in philosophy of mind and cognitive science has been guided by the assumption that minds are composed of intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible and thus unobservable to everyone but their owners. I challenge this claim. I defend the view that at least some mental states and processes—or at least some parts of some mental states and processes—are at times visible, capable of being directly perceived by others. I further argue that, despite its initial implausibility, this view receives robust support from several strands of empirical research.


PhenomenologyPhilosophy of mindSocial cognitionEmpathyDistributed cognitionExtended mind

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center for Subjectivity ResearchUniversity of CopenhagenCopenhagen SDenmark